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Abstract 
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1  Introduction 
The Unites States has been running large trade and current account deficits since almost 
two and a half decades. Their size has grown remarkably (both in absolute and in relative 
terms) since the early 2000s and peaked in 2006 at $ 811 billion, i.e. 6.15% of the US GDP 
(see Figure 1).1 The debate regarding the causes of the evolution of the US current account 
balance has been long and lively. Ultimately, a consensus has emerged on a few key factors: 
the overvaluation of the US dollar, in particular vis à vis the currencies of a number of 
emerging market economies; the expansionary economic policy measures undertook in the 
US after the year 2001; the financial underdevelopment of many emerging economies, 
together with their massive accumulation of foreign reserves; the extraordinary increase in 
the price of the primary commodities whose production is concentrated in few emerging 
markets.2 
Figure 1: The U.S. current account and its components. 1980–2007 
  
Such an interpretation seems not much contested anymore, in particular after the 
emergence of the financial crisis in mid-2007. Nonetheless, disagreement remains as to 
what measures policymakers should undertake both to support the needed process of 
                                                          
1The largest part of the annual deficits is due to trade imbalances, while unilateral transfers and 
income payments tend to offset each other. 
2See Fracasso (2007) for a more detailed discussion. 
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adjustment and to prevent the latter from occurring in a disorderly manner (Blanchard et 
al., 2005; Rogoff, 2006; Engel and Rogers, 2006; Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2007; Cooper, 2008). 
A number of economists (see for instance Cline, 2005a,b; Bergsten, 2008) have argued 
in favour of a new international exchange rate agreement among the major countries, 
aiming to achieve the realignment of exchange rates at the worldwide level. Such advocated 
plan has been dubbed as “new Plaza" after the famous agreement reached in 1985 by the 
representatives of the countries of the G-5 to produce a gradual and steady adjustment of 
the dollar against the currencies of the US major trade partners. The global nature of the 
imbalances, is argued, calls for international policy coordination.  
Not all economists have agreed with this proposal. Some have argued that coordinating 
exchange rate interventions is more difficult in recent times than it was in the 1980s. The 
number of parties involved in the imbalances is far larger and this would require more 
demanding negotiations, harder evaluations of the optimal exchange rates and stronger 
enforcement mechanisms that, incidentally, are not in place at the moment. A large 
devaluation of the dollar on a trade-weighted basis may dent current account imbalances 
only if most countries intervene contemporaneously and in a coordinated manner: all 
bilateral exchange rates need move in the appropriate way if one wants to close/reduce all 
imbalances at the same time.  
The recent debate on the evolution of the US dollar against the currencies of the main 
US trade partners fully reflects the complexity of the global network of bilateral trade 
imbalances. On the one hand, in the face of a large and steady depreciation of the dollar 
against the euro, European policymakers expressed concerns for the region’s loss of 
competitiveness.3 On the other hand, given the limited contraction of the US deficit in 
2007, further depreciation has been invoked by the US authorities. Such contrasting claims 
are not at odds: the limited and delayed impact on the US current account and trade balance 
of the depreciation of the dollar may be the result of its differentiated adjustment against 
the diverse trading partners and of other technical reasons pointed out by Milesi-Ferretti 
(2008). Thus, the often advocated additional depreciation of the dollar is not inconsistent 
with the recent favourable evolution of the US effective exchange rate. 
Notwithstanding the debate arisen around the new Plaza proposal, little empirical 
research has so far been conduced to shed light on the degree of complexity of the trade 
                                                          
3In addition, many have shown concerns for the asymmetric effects of US imbalances and of the 
dollar depreciation on the East Asian economies (see Mazier et al. 2008). 
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imbalances network and on its relations with the movement of the bilateral exchange rates.4 
As recently pointed by Fratzscher (2008a, p. 366) “the key question is what global exchange 
rate configurations will be in a world in which global current account imbalances are 
adjusting.” In this work we shall tackle this issue by means of a complex network analysis 
and developing two indices of imbalances-weighted exchange rates.  
More precisely, the paper unfolds as follows. We shall start in Section 2 with a brief 
discussion of the global imbalances at the time of the Plaza agreement and in the 2000s. 
Section 3 will discuss how the network of trade imbalances has changed over time, both in 
the number of its members and in their relationships. This will facilitate the appraisal of its 
much discussed, yet little measured degree of complexity. In Section 4 we shall address the 
evolution of the exchange rates in the period 2002–2006. We shall develop and examine 
two new trade-imbalances-weighted exchange rate indices. We shall then compare them 
with the (more traditional) trade-weighted effective exchange rates of the Bank of 
International Settlements (BIS). This tentative exercise, to our knowledge new, will help to 
assess the consistency of the movements of the bilateral exchange rates with the goal of 
closing/reducing all bilateral trade imbalances. In Section 5 we shall draw two main 
conclusions from our results. First, due to the large differences in the global economic 
trade-imbalances networks in the two decades, we warn that the parallelism of the current 
situation with that in the 1980s is somehow misleading. Second, in the light of the fact that 
the recent, uncoordinated exchange rate movements did not tackle trade imbalances in a 
mutually consistent way, and given the high complexity of the current trade imbalances 
network, we argue that a paradox emerges. The increased interdependence among countries 
makes coordination harder to achieve, yet more necessary. 
We would like to emphasise at this stage that the analysis we shall thus offer has no 
specific normative ambition. We claim neither that exchange rates are the most important 
factors in redressing global imbalances, nor that all bilateral trade imbalances require to be 
simultaneously closed.5 In addition, it does not investigate the determinants of exchange 
rate levels and fluctuations, and thus makes no reference to the role of capital flows in 
facilitating or preventing nominal adjustments. As stressed above, we aim to investigate the 
                                                          
4The most notable exception is represented by Dekle et al. (2007) which look at the consequences 
and welfare implications of closing global bilateral imbalances. In addition, Berthou (2008) and 
Thorbecke (2008) look, respectively, at bilateral exchange rates among OECD countries and 
triangular trading patterns in Asia. 
5Unfortunately, economic theory says nothing on the optimal number of imbalanced relations a 
country should run and little on the dynamically optimal value of net current account positions. 
Thus, there is no clear benchmark against which to compare the current situation. 
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degree of complexity of the trade imbalances network and to discuss its relations with the 
uncoordinated movement of the bilateral exchange rates in the last few years. 
 
2  Global imbalances: from the mid 1980s to the early 2000s 
After a gradual but steady improvement in the late 1980s, and a short-lived positive balance 
in 1991, the US started again to run large and growing trade and current account deficits in 
1992. Although the dollar declined against a number of currencies since 2002, the US trade 
and current account balances at the end of 2005 were still badly unbalanced. For this 
reason, the proposal of a new Plaza agreement emerged in 2005. One can find two main 
rationales for such proposal: the dollar was considerably overvalued on a trade-weighted 
basis and the pattern of its “uncoordinated" devaluation against the foreign currencies was 
inappropriate. Cline (2005b) and other economists argued that markets should not be left 
alone in setting the adjustment process because only coordination efforts may reduce the 
spillovers of the bilateral exchange rate adjustments on third parties. 
Even letting aside the political issues that may prevent such a large and variegated 
number of countries from converging on a clear and uniquely identified exchange rates 
realignment plan, two major objections to the new Plaza proposal have been raised. The 
first one stresses that the number of countries involved in the building up and in the 
maintenance of the global imbalances is much larger than that observed in 1985. The plan 
would require the daunting identification of a matrix of optimal bilateral exchange rates able 
to a) redress global imbalances (and in particular the US external deficits), and b) produce 
fluctuations of the bilateral exchange rates smaller than the variations to the overall trade-
weighted rates. The second objection refers to the fact that while exchange rates do 
influence current account and trade balances, they are not their unique or even main 
determinants (McKinnon and Schnabl, 2006). Domestic macroeconomic policies are as 
important as exchange rates, but much more difficult to coordinate, also because of the 
increasing importance of a number of big emerging markets.6 Both the objections above 
revolve around the following observation: the world economic environment has deeply 
                                                          
6A tangible example is the Multilateral Consultation established in 2006 by the IMF in order to 
provide a forum for the U.S., European Union, China, Saudi Arabia and Japan to discuss the global 
imbalances problem and to agree upon policy actions to tackle the vulnerabilities concerning each 
individual member. The Consultation has shown how reluctant to coordinate policy interventions 
sovereign countries tend to be. 
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changed since the 80s, thanks to the rapid growth of several emerging markets and to the 
accelerated process of economic integration in Europe.7  
It seems thus fundamental that economists and policymakers map the network of 
economic relationships laying behind global imbalances before setting the features of any 
policy coordination plan. Global imbalances have characterised both the late 1980s and the 
2000s, but are phenomena taking place in diverse environments. We start by looking at the 
overall net trade imbalances in both decades. 
Cline (2005a, p.5) claims that the situation at the end of 2005 was very similar to that in 
mid-1985: both years featured large and growing U.S. current account deficits, an 
overvalued U.S. dollar, and the risks of an abrupt adjustment in the dollar exchange rate 
triggered by exogenous factors. On the other hand, the US dollar touched its peak in 2002, 
not 2005. Furthermore, in both 1985 and 2002 the overvaluation of the dollar on a trade-
weighted basis reflected its bilateral undervaluation against the currencies of many US trade 
partners. For these reasons we will compare 1985 with both 2002 and 2005. 
As to the overall size of the imbalances, they amounted to 2.3% and 3% of world GDP 
respectively in 2002 and 2005, whereas they were close to 1.5% in 1985: global imbalances 
in recent years have outgrown those at the time of the Plaza agreement.8 The number of 
countries showing significant net trade imbalances has gone up too. In 1985 the countries 
having a surplus larger than 0.05% of world GDP were 8, and those with a deficit larger 
than the same threshold only 2. In 2002 these numbers grew to 14 and 4 respectively, 
reaching 16 and 7 in 2005. This shows that the number of countries with large trade 
surpluses is bigger in the 2000s than in the 80s, while the number of countries with large 
deficits remains small. 
These observations, although revealing, provide at most a prima facie evidence of the 
growing complexity in the global trade-imbalances network. The problem is that so far we 
have neglected all bilateral balances as much as the interdependence between countries. On 
these grounds, we move to a complex network approach to shed light on the international 
trade imbalances networks both in the 1980s and in the 2000s.  
                                                          
7We instead overlook the objection that exchange rate coordination is unlikely to be effective in a 
context of free capital movements. As shown by Klein et al. (1991) and Fratzscher (2008a), in fact, 
coordinated intervention can be useful through various channels. 
8This is consistent with Baclet et Vidon (2008) who document the profound change in the global 
distribution of net imbalances over the last three decades. 
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3  Network Analysis 
3.1  A telegraphic introduction 
Sociologists and psychologists have employed network analysis for the study of social 
interactions among people and groups since the beginning of the last century. Pioneering 
studies in this area include those by Milgram (1967) and Granovetter (1974), who studied 
the networks of social acquaintances and job market interactions. A number of powerful 
statistical tools for the analysis of network structures emerged outside the realm of social 
sciences thanks to the contributions of physicists, mathematicians, and computer scientists. 
Such methodological advances have then been applied to social analysis in recent studies by 
Goyal and Van der Leij (2006); Battiston et al. (2007); Hidalgo et al. (2007); Kali and Reyes 
(2007, 2009), where the interactions among academics through co-authorships, trade 
linkages among countries, networks within the “product space", credit chains, and 
bankruptcy propagation are analysed using complex networks. 
The network of international trade relations (or World Trade Network, WTN) has also 
been analysed by several authors (Kim and Shin, 2002; Serrano and Boguñà, 2003; 
Garlaschelli and Loffredo, 2004). These studies show that the WTN is very symmetric, find 
a core-periphery structure, and suggest the emergence of a “rich club phenomenon" 
whereby countries that have higher trade intensities trade a lot among themselves. Also, 
Fagiolo et al. (2008) find that the overall network structure is fairly stationary over time 
despite the recent wave of globalisation. Serrano et al (2007) look at bilateral trade 
imbalances and highlight how a small number of connections carries a large part of the 
fluxes travelling through the network.  
Recently, some papers have exploited this kind of analysis to answer more economic-
oriented research questions. For instance, Kali and Reyes (2007, 2009) have used a network 
approach to explain macroeconomic dynamics such as economic growth and episodes of 
financial contagion.  
In the present context, the appeal for using complex network analysis comes from the 
fact that this approach is able to recover the whole structure of the web of trade 
interactions and thus the evolution of the web of bilateral trade imbalances. In fact, by 
focusing on a small number of countries and only looking at few bilateral relations (as 
customarily done in the literature) one misses the complexity of the overall system.  
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3.2  Methodology and data 
In setting up the trade imbalances network, we have chosen to describe the world net trade 
relationship as a graph of N nodes, i.e. countries, connected by a set of bilateral links, each 
representing a trade relationship.9 While many papers concerned with trade flows have used 
undirected graphs because of the high symmetry of trade flows (see for instance Fagiolo et 
al., 2008), here we need consider directed bilateral flows. A link connecting two countries 
with a bilateral trade imbalance goes, in our representation, from the country in deficit 
towards the country in surplus. Potentially, from any node there might be both inward-
oriented and outward-oriented links: country A may in fact run a deficit with country B 
(which we call a creditor of A), while having a surplus vis-à-vis country C (which we call a 
debtor of A). 
In what follows we take into account the direction of the trade flows by building two 
distinct networks: one made of bilateral deficits, the other considering surpluses. A first way 
to describe international economic integration is to count the number of (in-coming or out-
going) links maintained by each node: this measure is referred to as node in-degree and out-
degree in the network literature. If one is instead interested in measuring the overall 
connectivity of the network, it is possible to look at the density of the graph, which 
amounts to the number of actual links over the maximum number of possible connections 
given the number of nodes. 
Following Serrano and Boguñà (2003) and Garlaschelli and Loffredo (2004) we also 
investigate whether low degree nodes have the tendency to establish relations with partners 
characterised by high (or low) degree. The literature suggests that this feature is relevant for 
the diffusion of whatever flows through the network. The correlation between the degree 
of a node and the average degree of its partners (average nearest neighbour degree, or ANND) 
delivers the statistical information on this characteristic of the network. If the correlation is 
positive, one is in presence of an assortative graph, where nodes tend to establish links with 
partners with similar level of connectivity; otherwise the network is said to be disassortative. 
Trade links are characterized by strong heterogeneity in their intensity: to take this into 
account we need to discriminate among strong and weak links: we do so by weighting each 
connection by the value of the trade imbalance it represents. The relevant network statistics 
can be extended and applied to a weighted version of the network. Node in- and out-strength 
are the sum of weights associated with the links held by any node. The larger the strength 
of a node, the stronger its participation in international markets. To investigate the amount 
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of heterogeneity in economic relationships we can associate to each node a Herfindahl-
Hirschman concentration index, which increases in the heterogeneity of link intensities. 
Furthermore, we study the degree of network assortativity from a weighted perspective by 
looking at the correlation between strength and average nearest neighbour strength (ANNS).  
We exploit data from the COMTRADE database compiled by the World Bank. We use 
both import and export flows to compute bilateral net trade positions, i.e. bilateral 
surpluses or deficits. All data are expressed in million of USD. For each pair of countries 
we have 4 potential trade flows, since each exchange is reported as an import by the 
destination countries and as an export by the source country. In principle we can therefore 
build two measures for each bilateral net position: as usual, the two measures never match. 
Moreover, not all the countries appear in the database as both reporter and partner so that 
not always all the information is actually available. To minimise measurement errors, 
whenever possible we average across the two measures of trade imbalance. 
We end up with a sample of 134 countries in 1985, which rises to 160 in 2002 and 2005. 
This change in sample size is due to three factors: i) the intensification and the liberalisation 
of international trade; ii) the political fragmentation of several countries during the 1990s, 
especially in Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union; iii) the improvements in data 
availability in several developing countries.10  
3.3  Network results 
Node Degree 
As said, the number of nodes/countries analysed in the network increases over time, 
moving from 134 in 1985 to 160 in the 2000s. Nonetheless, the network density, i.e. the 
number of active links over the maximum possible number of relations given the number 
of players, has also risen. This means that trade relationships have grown faster than trading 
countries so that in the last 20 years globalisation has not only implied that more countries 
trade, but (and especially) that countries trade with a larger number of partners.  
Table 1 reports summary statistics for node in- and out-degree. This is the simplest 
network characteristic and it associates with each node (country) the number of partners 
with which it runs a surplus or a deficit. Hence, to stick to our previous labels, in-degree 
                                                                                                                                                                           
9See Fagiolo et al. (2009) for a more detailed exposition of network concepts. 
10In what follows we will not investigate to what extent each of these reasons accounts for the 
enlargement of the trade imbalances web. Even though it could be interesting to distinguish the 
relative contribution of data availability from that of larger and more diversified exchanges of goods 
and services, data availability and trade intensity are likely correlated. 
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represents, for each country, the number of its debtors while out-degree the number of its 
creditors. Results for density are confirmed by the larger mean and median values of node 
in- and out-degree over time. This pattern holds both looking at absolute values and in 
terms of the total number of potential partners in the sample (reported in parenthesis in 
Table 1).  
  
Table 1: Summary statistics on node degree 
 
 1985 2002 2005
Nodes 134 160 160
Density 0.235 0.332 0.334
In-degree: mean 31.32 (23%) 52.86 (33%) 55.31 (35%)
In-degree: median 22.00 (17%) 45.00 (28%) 48.50 (30%)
In-degree: st. dev. 24.67 34.09 34.87
In-degree: max 101 (76%) 128 (80%) 131 (82%)
In-degree: min 1 4 5
 
Out-degree: mean 31.32 (23%) 52.86 (33%) 55.31 (35%)
Out-degree: median 29.00 (22%) 51.00 (32%) 54.00 (34%)
Out-degree: st. dev. 15.49 17.17 17.47
Out-degree: max 79 (60%) 100 (63%) 94 (59%)
Out-degree: min 5 10 14
Number in parentheses are relative to max number of possible links 
  
In the 1985, the median country has a surplus against almost 22 partners and a deficit with 
29; in 2002 and 2005 the median country has a surplus with 45–48 countries and a deficit 
with 51–54. While the mean and median values of out-degree (i.e. number of creditors) are 
close, the mean value of in-degree (i.e. number of debtors) remains higher than the median 
one in all years. This implies that most countries have only few debtors, but some have 
surpluses with a numerous set of partners. This is confirmed by the fact that the maximum 
value of in-degree is larger than that of out-degree. These results represent a first additional 
piece of evidence about the increasing complexity of the trade imbalances network over 
time. 
Figure 2 reports the distribution of normalised in- and out-degrees for 1985, 2002 and 
2005.11 One can notice that the distribution of in-degree is relatively more skewed (to the 
right) than the distribution of out-degree. Moreover, such asymmetry falls from 1985 to 
2005 in both cases. Hence, consistently with the descriptive statistics discussed above, 
Figure 2 shows that countries tend to run surpluses and deficits with an increasing number 
of partners over time, thus corroborating the idea of increasing complexity. A formal test 
                                                          
11The normalisation is meant to offset the change in the number of countries analysed over the 
years. 
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for the equality of the distributions rejects the null hypothesis and supports the visual 
intuition that the distributions of both in- and out-degree have changed from 1985 to the 
2000s. 
Figure 2: Degree distribution 
  
Interestingly, Figure 2 shows that the distribution of in-degrees spans a wider support, 
something that one can appreciate also by looking at the ranges of in- and out-degree in the 
descriptive statistics summarised in Table 1. There, in fact, it appears that the difference 
between the maximum and minimum values taken by in-degree is larger than in the case of 
out-degree. Similarly, while the average number of both incoming and outgoing links has 
increased over time, the corresponding standard deviation has remained stable in the case 
of the latter, while increasing markedly for the former. This result is the likely outcome of 
the new and increased role played by a group of emerging countries (mainly exporting 
primary commodities) that in recent years display trade surpluses with many partners. 
In Figure 3 we plot the distribution of the change in in- and out-degree between 1985 
and 2002/2005. One can see that the mode of the distribution corresponds to higher values 
in the case of out-degree: this suggests that —for the representative country— the increase 
in the number of creditors is larger than the increase in the number debtors or, to put it 
differently, that the number of partners with whom the representative country runs a deficit 
has grown more than the number of countries with whom it runs a trade surplus.  
A further change in the topology of the network of trade imbalances is testified by the 
correlation between in- and out-degree. Positive and significant in 1985 (equal to 0.45), the 
correlation turns negative in 2002 and 2005, taking values of -0.13 and -0.24. Hence, while 
in the mid 1980s countries with many debtors tended to have also many creditors, in more 
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recent years a large number of debtors is associated with a small number of creditors. This 
is consistent with the previous findings suggesting that the number of bilateral deficits run 
by each country has grown faster than the number of surpluses. Also, we find that while 
there is not statistical relation between the overall net position of a country and the number 
of its debtors, larger deficits are associated with many creditors, and that this feature is 
strengthening over time.  
Figure 3: Difference in degrees 
  
Average Nearest Network Degree 
The number of partners a country is related to is often a good signal of its importance in 
the network. Nonetheless, the relevance of two countries exhibiting the same node-degree 
statistics may differ according to the degree of connection of their respective partners. In an 
undirected network a measure that is often employed to quantify how a country’s partners 
are themselves connected is the average nearest-neighbour degree (ANND). For each node, 
ANND measures the average number of links maintained by its partners and, therefore, it 
deals with 2-step away relationships. In the present context this metrics does not say much 
about the nature of the relationships between each pair of partners: in a directed network, 
each country is, at the same time, potentially creditor to some partners and debtor to 
others. Rather than grouping them all together, we would like to distinguish between 
creditors of one’s creditors, creditors of one’s debtors, and so on. Accordingly, there are 
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four possible variants of the average nearest-neighbour degree that can be used in a directed 
framework.12  
Table 2: Summary statistics on ANND 
 
 1985 
 ANNDin,in ANNDout,out ANNDin,out ANNDout,in 
mean 43.129 38.423 41.086 53.392
median 41.833 38.351 40.859 54.001
st. dev. 14.082 6.237 6.329 10.292
max 77.667 56.4 55.222 73.429
min 19.619 24.283 25.417 28.889
 2002 
 ANNDin,in ANNDout,out ANNDin,out ANNDout,in 
mean 42.799 38.244 41.372 55.063
median 40.364 38.611 41.138 55.429
st. dev. 13.431 5.368 6.466 10.487
max 90 53 63.571 78.667
min 11 24 22 29.469
 2005 
 ANNDin,in ANNDout,out ANNDin,out ANNDout,in 
mean 55.095 51.127 58.185 74.835
median 52.818 51.623 58.409 75.168
st. dev. 12.487 3.473 2.976 8.058
max 98.938 57.833 66.8 98.5
min 30.556 41.396 46.625 54.778
  
 
For each country one can in fact look at a) the debtors of one’s debtors; b) the creditors of 
one’s debtors; c) the debtors of one’s creditors; and d) the creditors of one’s creditors. We 
label these four measures as ANNDin,in, ANNDin,out, ANNDout,in, ANNDout,out, where the 
superscript indicates the country of reference and the subscript the type of relation 
maintained by its partners.13 Table 2 summarises some descriptive statistics for the 4 
indices. One can see that mean and median values always increase over time, while the 
standard deviation takes smaller values. This is consistent with a process of generalised 
increased interconnectedness among countries. 
The correlation coefficients between the incoming and outgoing links and ANNDs 
provide some additional insights. This information is summarised in Table 3: the 
correlations are all negative and significant in 1985. Thus, for instance, countries with many 
creditors (high out-degree) tend to run deficits with partners that, on average, are 
characterised by few bilateral surpluses and deficits. The same applies to countries running 
                                                          
12To the best of our knowledge, these four metrics have never been used in the literature so far. 
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many trade surpluses (high in-degree) in 1985. In network analysis such a negative 
correlation is usually interpreted as a signal of a hierarchical structure in the network since it 
suggests the existence of a subset of more central nodes connected with many partners and 
a periphery of players linked with the hubs, but scarcely connected among themselves. For 
three out of our four correlations the sign remains the same over the years, and although 
the values get smaller (in absolute values) they are always significantly different from zero. 
On the contrary, the correlation between out-degree and ANNDout,out becomes positive in 
2002 and further increases in 2005. Hence, we observe that in the 2000s countries running 
many bilateral deficits tend to be connected with partners that also run a large number of 
trade deficits. 
Table 3: Degree-ANND correlation coefficients 
 
 1985 
 ANNDin,in ANNDout,out ANNDin,out ANNDout,in 
in-degree -0.57 -0.62
out-degree -0.52 -0.72
 
 2002 
 ANNDin,in ANNDout,out ANNDin,out ANNDout,in 
in-degree -0.46 -0.39
out-degree 0.25 -0.38
 
 2005 
 ANNDin,in ANNDout,out ANNDin,out ANNDout,in 
in-degree -0.42 -0.16
out-degree 0.44 -0.38
All coefficients are significant at 5% 
  
 
Weighted Analysis: Node Strength and ANNS 
Fagiolo et al. (2009) have shown that limiting the analysis to a binary characterisation of the 
network can lead to overlook relevant information about its structure. Although the 
reflection focuses here on the increased complexity of the web of bilateral net trade, and 
therefore it is concerned more with the number of players than with the size of their 
imbalances, one cannot disregard this latter aspect. To look at the weighted version of the 
network, we attach to each link a weight equivalent to the size of the trade imbalance it 
                                                                                                                                                                           
13Thus, ANNDin,in measures the number of debtors of one’s own debtors and ANNDout,in the 
number of debtors of one’s own creditors. It is worth noticing that the country of reference is 
excluded from the count of its own debtors/creditors’ partners. 
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represents: relationships cease to be treated as homogeneous (as we have done so far), but 
are evaluated on the basis of their importance (i.e. magnitude). The weighted counterpart of 
node degree is node strength. The distribution of node strength is, as usual, very skewed as 
the vast majority of bilateral trade imbalances is very small.  
Table 4 reports summary statistics for node strength. We see that mean and median 
values have significantly increased, not only between 1985 and the 2000s, but also between 
2002 and 2005. Heterogeneity across links has also grown markedly, something that 
suggests how treating all relationships as equal can be misleading. (From the Table 4 one 
can also appreciate how the median deficit is substantially larger than the median surplus.)  
Table 4: Summary statistics on node strength 
 
  1985 2002 2005   1985 2002 2005 
 In-strength  Disparity 
mean  3384.00 9655.72 17754.69   0.30 0.25 0.29 
median  374.12 879.14 1558.07   0.23 0.18 0.20 
st. dev.  9305.91 24644.93 46193.55   0.22 0.20 0.31 
max   88565.40 176967.08 409481.27   1.00 0.96 0.96 
min  0.02 0.11 2.69   0.05 0.03 0.03 
        
 Out-strength  Disparity 
mean  3384.00 9655.72 17754.69   0.20 0.17 0.22 
median  533.53 1920.18 3885.65   0.17 0.12 0.14 
st. dev.  12214.04 38337.80 65227.92   0.12 0.14 0.27 
max   132977.51 460040.79 770254.82   0.74 0.83 0.83 
min  6.31 33.05 52.38   0.05 0.04 0.04 
Figures in million USD (except Disparity, which is an index number) 
 
  
We can assess more precisely the degree of heterogeneity by looking at node disparity, 
which is nothing else than a Herfindhal-Hirschman concentration index applied to the 
strength of each country’s relationships. Thus, larger values imply larger concentration of 
bilateral trade imbalances or, in other words, that a small number of links account for the 
majority of a country’s overall trade imbalances. It appears that disparity is consistently 
higher for incoming links (i.e. surpluses) than for outgoing ones (i.e. deficits), suggesting 
that deficits tend to be more evenly distributed. This result is consistent with what 
previously found also for node degree. 
As to correlations, in- and out-strength are positively correlated. Furthermore, the 
correlations between in- and out-degree and the corresponding strengths are, as expected, 
positive: countries with many creditors tend to run larger bilateral deficits.  
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In a similar fashion as before, we can look at 2-step away relationships by means of 
ANNS. These measures allow to analyse the condition of each country’s partners. The 
correlation analysis (not reported) suggests that partners of countries running large 
surpluses are characterised by small surpluses and large deficits. Similarly, countries running 
large bilateral deficits tend to be connected to partners that also display large deficits or 
small surpluses.  
An interesting way to look at degree and strength at the same time is to work with the 
ratio of out- over in-degree and the ratio of out- over in-strength for each country. After 
normalisation, each of the ratios ranges between 1 and -1: they take a positive value if the 
country has more creditors than debtors (in the case of node degree) or if it is running an 
overall trade deficit (in the case of node strength). Focusing on the ratios between out- and 
in-strength, it can be noticed that both the mean and median values are positive and 
increase over time. Also, the number of countries in surplus in 1985 that turn into deficit in 
2002 is larger than the number of countries moving in the opposite direction (19 Vs. 11). 
Figure 4 combines these two ratios and identifies the dynamic of a few selected 
countries between 1985 and 2005. The two panels of the figure are divided in four parts: in 
the upper left quadrant there are countries that run an overall trade deficit and are also 
characterised by a number of debtors larger than the number of creditors (in-degree larger 
than out-degree). Similarly, in the upper right part one finds countries that have more 
creditors than debtors while running an overall trade deficit. The interpretation of the 
bottom quadrants is similar, save for the fact that countries displaying an overall trade 
surplus are clustered there.  
 Some countries do not change quadrant over time: Germany, Japan, France and the US 
display little or no change at all. The first two countries keep running trade surpluses and 
having a large number of debtors, France remains in deficit but increases its debtors more 
than its creditors, while the US runs bilateral deficits with many countries, something that 
makes it an overall debtor. Other countries, instead, modify their situation. One of the most 
significant changes concerns China that, not surprisingly, moves from a deficit to a surplus 
position and increases the overall number of its creditors.  
Big players in the network 
Having discussed the position of a few key players we now turn to the picture of the whole 
network of trade imbalances, as represented in Figure 5. A few features emerge quite clearly 
from this graphical representation: in 1985 the centre of the stage is taken by (current) G7 
countries, which dominate the scene and which we have highlighted by putting them in the 
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middle of the graph. The main trade imbalance is the deficit of the US versus Japan, which 
in fact was one of the triggers of the Plaza agreement. The contribution of countries not 
belonging to the G7 club is very limited and mainly due to Hong Kong, which at that time 
operated as a platform to/from China, and Saudi Arabia because of its oil exports. The 
picture changes in 2005 and, consistently with what discussed above, the number of 
important players increases. Previously peripheral economies such as China and Mexico rise 
to the stage and, in particular, the relationship between China and the US shadows all other 
links. Germany reinforces its position as a global creditor, while the UK moves in the 
opposite direction becoming a global debtor. 
Table 5 reports the values for a number of selected economies. In terms of node 
degrees, the US in 1985 has almost the same number of creditors and debtors (around 60). 
Over the years, thanks to the globalisation process and to the extension of its trade 
network, both its creditors and debtors increase in number. The group of debtors grows to 
72 and creditors reach 86 in 2002. In 2005 the US has 91 creditors and 68 debtors. A 
movement in the opposite direction characterises China that, over the last 20 years, doubles 
the number of its bilateral surpluses (from 59 to 121), while slightly reducing the number of 
countries against which it runs a trade deficit.  
 
Figure 4: Selected countries trade-imbalances ratios 
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Figure 5: The network of trade imbalances in 1985 and 2005 
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Table 5: Network indicators for selected countries 
 
  In Out In Out Net trade 
Country degree degree strength strength balance 
 1985 
Brazil 77 11 14 542.49 1 438.72 13 103.77 
Canada 70 44 20 676.12 5 879.65 14 796.47 
China 59 45 4 555.88 14 980.44 -10 424.56 
France 83 48 9 229.97 18 185.77 -8 955.81 
Germany 86 46 47 783.42 13 864.16 33 919.27 
Hong Kong 87 23 9 342.18 9 757.99 -415.81 
Italy 67 60 12 214.09 17 134.43 -4 920.34 
Japan 95 36 88 565.40 33 538.87 55 026.53 
Korea 59 42 8 185.59 7 457.87 727.72 
Mexico 62 36 10 890.62 1 190.57 9 700.06 
Saudi Arabia 28 35 12 866.20 6 841.53 6 024.67 
UK 77 55 15 197.01 19 630.65 -4 433.64 
USA 61 68 15 546.71 132 977.51 -117 430.80 
 2002 
Brazil 122 26 21 359.17 7 842.02 13 517.15 
Canada 84 74 66 964.62 28 610.72 38 353.90 
China 117 38 176 967.08 28 244.00 148 723.08 
France 106 53 39 340.59 45 122.93 -5 782.34 
Germany 111 48 150 884.05 27 026.72 123 857.33 
Hong Kong 101 50 23 349.64 78 406.76 -55 057.11 
Italy 109 50 53 048.59 42 858.48 10 190.11 
Japan 108 51 162 135.20 59 062.29 103 072.91 
Korea 120 39 53 714.00 37 918.83 15 795.17 
Mexico 51 86 40 440.52 30 907.28 9 533.24 
Saudi Arabia 79 43 38 623.56 8 771.37 29 852.19 
UK 82 77 22 169.78 85 859.77 -63 690.00 
USA 72 86 26 305.94 460 040.79 -433 734.85 
 2005 
Brazil 131 21 55 851.88 6 851.31 49 000.56 
Canada 84 75 104 168.86 49 222.19 54 946.67 
China 121 37 409 481.27 78 875.51 330 605.76 
France 93 64 48 768.69 97 644.24 -48 875.55 
Germany 114 45 257 378.93 59 334.43 198 044.50 
Hong Kong 109 45 26 895.16 130 866.10 -103 970.94 
Italy 100 59 81 142.93 90 742.46 -9 599.53 
Japan 120 39 219 519.25 116 464.97 103 054.28 
Korea 126 31 107 823.71 63 923.23 43 900.48 
Mexico 58 94 66 887.90 50 487.97 16 399.93 
Saudi Arabia 89 53 122 868.68 10 662.87 112 205.81 
UK 79 80 43 806.32 152 754.86 -108 948.54 
USA 68 91 38 650.70 770 254.82 -731 604.12 
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4  Trade imbalances-weighted effective exchange rates 
4.1  Motivations and methodology 
The complexity of the network of trade imbalances bears not only on the difficulty to 
orchestrate a multilateral plan of interventions to redress such imbalances, but also on the 
synthetic measures normally adopted to track the evolution of exchange rates over time. In 
particular, in what follows, we shall focus on the nominal effective exchange rate (EER), 
that is a synthetic way to seize the evolution of a currency vis-à-vis its bilateral exchange 
rates (see MacDonald, 2007 for a discussion). As we shall endeavour to show, trade-
weighted EERs do not allow to appraise whether the movements of the bilateral rates are 
consistent with the simultaneous closure of all the bilateral trade imbalances. This 
observation casts some doubts on the appropriateness of traditional EERs as indicators of 
the evolution of the exchange rates in a context of widespread and large imbalances. 
In general, the EER is a weighted average of a basket of bilateral exchange rates.14 The 
choices of the currency basket, the weighting scheme, the base period and the updating 
method (in case of time-varying weights) touch on the EERs: central banks and 
international institutions have developed various alternative indices, which precisely differ 
in one or more of these dimensions.15  
In most cases, researchers have developed EERs which serve as indicators of countries’ 
level of competitiveness. In such a case, the ideal approach to build EERs would be to use 
a global model-based weighting scheme of bilateral trade flows. The high degree of 
complexity of such theoretical approach, however, has led researchers and policymakers to 
rely on simpler indices (based on actual trade flows) that nonetheless give a qualitative 
picture of the movements in the level of countries’ competitiveness. Among these indices, 
the most common schemes to weight bilateral exchange rates are the global, bilateral and 
double weighting approaches. The BIS trade-weighted effective exchange rate index (TWI 
hereafter) is built along this method. The broader basket composition of the TWI currently 
encompasses 52 economies (see Klau and Fung, 2006). 
                                                          
14Among the first works endorsing EERs we recall Artus and Rhomberg (1973), Black (1976) and 
Hooper and Morton (1978). 
15Several existing indices, for instance, differ in terms of the scope of their currency basket. This is 
due to the fact that currency baskets are not based on a single theoretical foundation and are also 
influenced by data availability and integrity. 
   
 21  
The variety of EER measures is not exclusively the product of competition among 
research centres. In fact, the very concept of EER is not univocally defined and can be 
declined according to the economic issue to analyse. In particular, the choice of the 
weighting scheme and the basket of currencies hinges on the phenomenon under scrutiny.16 
This is clearly illustrated by the fact that, besides various trade-weighted EERs, researchers 
also developed capital-weighted EERs (Makin and Robson, 1999). 
Since country competitiveness is usually the issue addressed by EERs, the indices do 
not take into account trade imbalances, but gross trade flows. It follows that such EER 
measures, while usefully condensing in a unique figure the average evolution of various 
bilateral exchange rates, do not help to discern whether exchange rates move so as to close 
bilateral and overall trade imbalances. The question, then, is whether it would be possible to 
build alternative EER indices which take into account bilateral trade imbalances, rather than 
competitiveness.  
Positive and negative bilateral imbalances are to be treated separately if one wants to 
build EER measures that convey information about both exchange rates and trade 
imbalances. Accordingly, we build two imbalances-weighted indices and use them to look at 
the evolution of the exchange rates during 2002–2006. SWI is a surplus-weighted EER 
index. In the SWI for country i, the basket includes all the currencies of the countries which 
the country i has a trade surplus with. The currency of country j enters in the SWI for i 
weighted by the ratio of country i’s bilateral trade surplus with j over country i’s overall 
surpluses. DWI is a deficit-weighted EER index: the calculation of such EER for country i 
is based on a basket including all the currencies of the countries which country i has a 
deficit with. The weigh attached to the currency of country m is proportional to ratio of the 
bilateral trade deficit of i with m relative to i’s total deficits.  
Having set the criteria to form the baskets of currencies entering into the SWIs and the 
DWIs, a decision need be made in terms of i) the extension of the overall sample of 
currencies, and ii) the year of reference for the weights. Starting with the latter, we decide to 
use the bilateral trade imbalances in 2002 to build the weighting schemes. To allow 
comparability, all indices are then normalised and set equal to 100 in 2002. As to the 
composition of the samples, we will adopt two: one (which we call broad) consists in the 
entire set of countries considered in Section 3 (i.e. 160 countries); the other (narrow) is the 
BIS sample of countries for which we have trade and exchange rate data (that is 49 
                                                          
16See Turn and Van’t dack (1993); Klau and Fung (2006); Erlandsson and Markowski (2006) on this. 
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countries).17 The former measure will bring into the picture the complexity of the network 
of imbalances, while the latter will be used to compare to which extent SWIs and DWIs 
diverge from the TWIs calculated by the BIS, once an (almost) equivalent sample is used to 
build the indices. Notably, the main message of our exercise does not change with the 
adopted sample of countries and should not be attributed to the extension of the basket to 
an unusually large number of foreign currencies. 
While our statistical analysis will be based on the entire samples at hand, for the sake of 
keeping tables and graphs readable, in what follows we shall discuss the indices for a limited 
number of countries. As explained above, however, they do not coincide with the baskets 
and the samples used to calculate the indices. 
4.2  The evolution of the exchange rates in the 2000s 
Tables 6 and 7 reproduce the SWIs and DWIs for a subsample of 24 countries.18 We report 
both broad indices including 160 countries (Table 6) and narrow indices taking in the 49 
countries that belong to the BIS sample (Table 7). In addition, the broader TWIs provided 
by the BIS over the same period are also reproduced. Even though our measures are not 
directly comparable to those of the BIS because of the differences in the methods used to 
construct the indices, we shall compare the various measures to see to which extent they 
convey diverging or compatible information. As before, we shall start with a few statistical 
findings and then move to analyse the experience of some selected countries. 
The correlations between the broad DWIs and SWIs in 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 are, 
respectively, 0.68, 0.47, 0.25, and 0.05. These statistics convey the impression that the 
movements of SWIs and DWIs are not correlated over the medium term. However, if we 
focus on the narrow indices, the correlation between DWIs and SWIs remains in all years 
high and close to 0.75.19 Broad and narrow indices vary in the same direction (with respect 
to 2002) in 80–85% of the countries in each year. In particular, the SWIs and DWIs of the 
                                                          
17Admittedly, our restricted sample and that used by the BIS do not perfectly coincide. First, we 
exclude Taiwan and Romania for the lack of trade data. Secondly, while the BIS treats the euro-
area as a single entity in computing the EER indices for the other economies and calculates a set 
of EER indices for each euro-area country taking intra-euro area trade into account, we deal with 
euro-area countries as independent ones. This complicates the interpretation of the indices for 
the countries of the area (since there cannot be bilateral exchange rate changes between them in 
the 2000s, the variability of the indices is limited to the differences in their trade imbalances), 
but it avoids cancelling out the intra-European trade imbalances. 
18Both EERs are computed over the period 2002-2006. 
19In addition, the correlation of the broad indices of only the 49 countries entering the BIS 
sample is high and close to 0.70. 
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largest trading countries move in the same direction, whereas those of the remaining 
countries tend to diverge more often. Notably, this is particularly true for the SWIs.20  
Both broad and narrow DWIs and SWIs are positively correlated with the TWIs of the 
BIS. The correlation does decline from about 0.8 in 2003 to circa 0.6 in 2006, but it remains 
substantial. The pairwise comparison of the direction of change of the narrow indices (with 
respect to 2002) reveals that in 80% of the cases TWI changes have the same sign as, 
respectively, those of DWIs and SWIs. The three indices change in the same direction in 
60% of the countries in 2003, 70% in 2004 and 2005, and 80% in 2006. These findings 
suggest that our indices are not at odds with traditional trade weighted EERs and allow to 
draw additional information. For instance, they reveal that from 2002 to 2006 the exchange 
rates tended to move not so as to close bilateral imbalances (since this would have required 
a negative correlation between SWIs and DWIs), but rather the overall imbalances of the 
single countries.  
 
Table 6: Broad EER indices 2002–2006 
 
DWI SWI 
Whole sample Whole sample 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Argentina 100 92.6 85.4 86.2 82.2 104.3 98.8 94.8 87.7
Australia 100 110.1 119.4 124 121.1 113.2 122.7 123.9 123.6
Brazil 100 87.7 88.8 106.3 119.8 93.7 95.9 113.6 126.4
Canada 100 104.5 107.4 114 120.7 112 120.6 129.5 138.3
Chile 100 96 107.4 112.4 119.5 96 105.1 113.5 120.6
China 100 99 96.4 92.9 91.3 96.6 94.1 94.7 97.3
France 100 105.8 109 108.8 109 110.9 115 113.9 114
Germany 100 107.6 111.4 111.4 113.3 109.7 113.7 113.1 113.4
Hong Kong 100 96.2 93.3 92.4 91.3 98.2 96.5 96.3 96.3
Ireland 100 111.3 112.7 114 114 106.3 109.5 109.4 109.8
Italy 100 107.5 110.9 110.7 110.5 112.2 117.8 116.7 117.1
Japan 100 105.5 111.7 110.4 103.5 104.9 109.9 106.4 99.6
Korea 100 98.6 98.2 110.5 120.6 103.7 106.5 118.2 125.8
Malaysia 100 93.3 90.6 92.3 95 96.7 94.3 94 96.3
Mexico 100 82.8 74.9 75.9 74.7 89.6 85.5 87.8 87.6
New Zealand 100 110.9 116.8 121.9 112.1 122.3 135.7 140.7 127.8
Norway 100 100.4 99.1 104.4 104.6 101 98 101.9 101.1
Singapore 100 97.6 97.3 99.5 104.5 99.3 100.3 101.5 106.7
South Africa 100 128.6 143.6 144.6 134.4 146.1 182.9 206.9 226.2
Spain 100 106.6 110 110 110.3 107.1 110.3 108.7 109
Sweden 100 102.8 104 102.4 103.4 113.2 119.7 116.3 117.2
Switzerland 100 99.4 98.8 98.6 97.1 112.4 118.6 116.7 115.4
UK 100 96.9 102 100.7 101.6 104.7 114.3 112.6 113.1
USA 100 95.5 92.2 90.9 89.8 92.2 87 86 86.1
DWI and SWI calculated on baskets of 160 countries. Reference year 2002. 
 
                                                          
20The correlation between broad and narrow SWIs falls over time (from 0.77 to 0.54), whereas it 
remains almost constant and close to 1 (i.e. 0.97) in the case of broad and narrow DWIs. 
Table 7: Narrow EER indices 2002–2006 
 
 
  DWI SWI TWI 
      2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2003 2004 2005 2006 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Argentina  100 92.4 85.1 86 82 101.2 94.2 89.7 82.3 107 103 102.8 101.4 
Australia  100 109.5 118.3 122.8 119.9 109.6 116.6 116.6 116.5 112.7 121.6 125.2 124.8 
Brazil  100 84.5 85 101.7 115.6 90.2 90.9 107.7 119.3 96.9 101.2 125.4 140.6 
Canada  100 103.7 106.3 112.4 118.9 112 120.6 129.4 138.3 110.3 115.8 122.7 129.6 
Chile  100 95.5 106.7 111.5 118.7 94.2 102.2 110.5 117.4 93.8 100 105.7 110.1 
China  100 96.1 92.4 87.5 85.3 96.2 93.6 94.1 96.6 93.2 90.5 89.5 90.9 
France  100 103.9 106 105.6 105.6 108.8 111.6 110.1 109.9 106.1 108.2 106.8 106.1 
Germany  100 104.9 107.1 106.5 107.9 107.9 110.9 110.3 110.4 105.9 107.7 105.6 104.7 
Hong Kong  100 96.2 93.2 92.3 91.2 97.5 95.4 94.9 94.6 90.7 84.7 82.4 81.4 
Ireland  100 110.6 111.1 111.5 110.7 105.9 108.9 108.7 109.2 110.6 114 113.6 115.6 
Italy  100 103.4 104.8 104.4 104 111.3 116.2 114.8 115.1 106.5 108.5 106.9 106.6 
Japan  100 99.6 103.1 101.7 94 104.5 109.3 105.7 98.8 100.2 101 94.8 85.8 
Korea  100 94.9 92.2 104.1 115 102.7 105 116.2 123.2 100.8 102 114 122.1 
Malaysia  100 92.6 89.6 91.3 93.9 96 93.3 92.7 94.8 94.3 89.9 90 93.3 
Mexico  100 82.6 74.7 75.7 74.5 88.7 84.4 87 86.5 88.7 84.7 87.8 87.9 
New Zealand  100 108.7 113 117.5 107.9 120.6 132.8 137.3 123.6 114.7 123.4 130.4 121.2 
Norway  100 97.7 94.8 99.5 98.6 100.3 97 100.9 100.1 99.7 95.5 98.6 98.3 
Singapore  100 95.6 94.1 96.6 101.7 98.2 98.4 98.9 103.6 96.2 95.1 93.8 95.8 
South Africa  100 122.4 133.3 133.5 123.4 126.3 137.5 139.1 130.4 131.8 143.7 145.7 139.9 
Spain  100 103.9 105.9 105.5 105.6 103.9 105.1 104.1 103.9 105.8 108.4 108.9 110.4 
Sweden  100 101.7 102.2 100.3 101.2 111.7 117.3 113.6 114.2 106.4 106.8 102 101.3 
Switzerland  100 97.8 96.6 96.2 94.4 111 116.4 114.1 112.7 100.5 99.5 97.4 94.7 
UK  100 96.4 101 99.3 99.6 100.9 108.3 106.3 106.5 96 99.7 97.7 98 
USA  100 93.8 89.9 88.2 86.9 83.6 75.1 73.7 73.8 93.8 89.6 88.2 87.6 
DWI and SWI calculated on baskets of 49 countries. TWI (BIS) calculated on a basket of 52 countries. Reference year 2002 
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It should be noted that this conclusion bears some implications for the issue we 
addressed in Section 3 of the paper. The very fact that bilateral exchange rates do not 
change so as to close the bilateral imbalances means that the uncoordinated exchange rate 
movements observed in recent years cannot be presumed to have worked for the 
simultaneous adjustment of the imbalances of all countries. Clearly, this observation has no 
direct normative implications on the desirable evolution of the exchange rates, in that we 
do not claim that the ER should move so as to actually close all bilateral imbalances. Short 
of that, our analysis mainly aims to show that this has hardly happened so far and that 
stronger coordination is needed if one believes, as the advocates of the new Plaza implicitly 
do, that the reduction of the bilateral imbalances is a sensible goal.  
Admittedly, as can be seen in Tables 6 and 7, the patterns of DWIs and SWIs, on the 
one hand, and the TWIs, on the other, sensibly diverge for three countries: Argentina, 
Japan and Singapore. In the case of Japan, this is particularly significant for the DWI 
measures and probably due to the limited number of creditors the country has. In the case 
Argentina and Singapore, instead, no simple explanation can account for the divergence. 
However, we argue, this might not be a real problem. Our indices, in fact, mirror the EERs 
calculated by the central banks of those countries, i.e. the Multilateral Real Exchange Rate 
Index calculated by the Central Bank of Argentina and the NEER of the Singaporean dollar 
elaborated by the Monetary Authority of Singapore. This result is encouraging given that 
the MAS monetary policy is an exchange rate-based policy, that is a managed float against a 
basket of foreign currencies. 
We find no statistically significant association in the direction of change of the SWIs 
and DWIs, on the one hand, and, the overall trade balances, on the other hand.21 This does 
not mean that exchange rates did not affect trade imbalances at all. Several reasons may in 
fact account for the apparent independence in the data. The first explanation is that changes 
in nominal exchange rate may not be as effective as those in real exchange rates in affecting 
trade balances. Moreover, the impact of exchange rate variations on trade balances 
ultimately depends on the demand and supply elasticities, which differ across countries and 
goods: there is therefore no theoretical reason to expect the existence of a one-to-one 
relationship between the changes in the exchange rates and those in the trade balances.  
We move now to consider the evolution of the indices for a few currencies and we plot 
the DWIs and SWIs for China and the G7 countries in Figure 6. The US dollar, around 
                                                          
21The Fisher exact test, the likelihood ratio G2 statistics and the Chi square Pearson statistics fail to 
reject the null hypothesis that the changes in the indices and in the trade balance measures are 
independent. 
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which any international adjustment process must revolve, did depreciate against foreign 
currencies in the period 2002–2006. The depreciation was larger towards the currencies of 
the debtors, rather than the creditors of the US. This finding, which maybe due to the very 
limited appreciation of the Chinese renmimbi over this time period, confirms that the 
depreciation of the dollar was not mainly directed towards the countries against which the 
US was running its largest deficits. Thus, it is not a case that, notwithstanding the overall 
depreciation of the dollar on a trade-weighted basis, neither the US gross bilateral 
imbalances nor its overall deficits were reduced in the time span 2002–2006. The 
appreciation of the euro and the Canadian dollar against the US dollar was not sufficiently 
ample to outweigh the movements of the currencies of China, Hong Kong, Japan, Mexico 
and Saudi Arabia.22  
We move now to consider the evolution of the indices for a few currencies and we plot 
the DWIs and SWIs for China and the G7 countries in Figure 6. The US dollar, around 
which any international adjustment process must revolve, did depreciate against foreign 
currencies in the period 2002–2006. The depreciation was larger towards the currencies of 
the debtors, rather than the creditors of the US. This finding, which maybe due to the very 
limited appreciation of the Chinese renmimbi over this time period, confirms that the 
depreciation of the dollar was not mainly directed towards the countries against which the 
US was running its largest deficits. Thus, it is not a case that, notwithstanding the overall 
depreciation of the dollar on a trade-weighted basis, neither the US gross bilateral 
imbalances nor its overall deficits were reduced in the time span 2002–2006. The 
appreciation of the euro and the Canadian dollar against the US dollar was not sufficiently 
ample to outweigh the movements of the currencies of China, Hong Kong, Japan, Mexico 
and Saudi Arabia.23  
 
 
 
                                                          
22This, in a way, corroborates the observation that the dollar has remained considerably overvalued 
on a trade-weighted exchange rate basis also because the pattern of its devaluation has been 
inappropriate. This is consistent with Fratzscher (2008b) who shows that the movements of 
European currencies have accounted historically for a share of the adjustment of the US dollar 
effective exchange rate that is much larger than their weights in the trade-weighted basket of the US 
dollar. 
23This, in a way, corroborates the observation that the dollar has remained considerably overvalued 
on a trade-weighted exchange rate basis also because the pattern of its devaluation has been 
inappropriate. This is consistent with Fratzscher (2008b) who shows that the movements of 
European currencies have accounted historically for a share of the adjustment of the US dollar 
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Figure 6: Plot of broad and narrow EER indices 2002-2006 
 
DWI_all and SWI_all calculated on 160 cu 160 currencies. DWI_BIS and SWI_BIS calculated on 
the BIS sample. Reference year 2002   
 
 
The Chinese renmimbi depreciated against both creditors and debtors, yet more largely 
against the former. This finding goes along with the limited depreciation of the US dollar 
against its creditors and shows that the Chinese authorities effectively prevented their 
currency from gaining value against the dollar. According to our findings, the Swiss franc 
appreciated against the currencies of the debtors and depreciated against those of the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
effective exchange rate that is much larger than their weights in the trade-weighted basket of the US 
dollar. 
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creditors, in a way consistent with the reduction of both positive and negative imbalances. 
This finding sheds light on why the Swiss overall surplus fell even though its TWI 
depreciated over time. The UK pound sterling remained almost constant against the 
creditors of the UK and appreciated against its debtors. It could be argued that this has 
contributed to the enlargement of the net overall deficit of the country. 
The DWIs and SWIs of France, Germany, Ireland, Italy and Spain went in the same 
direction, most likely because of the appreciation of the euro against several non-European 
currencies. By the same token, the patterns of the DWIs and the SWIs for these countries 
mirror those of the TWIs. With respect to TWIs, our indices allow to detect a relatively 
larger appreciation of the Italian EERs against the debtors of Italy than its creditors; this is 
consistent with the overall net surplus that the country was running in 2002. 
As in the case of Italy, the Canadian dollar, the Korean won, the New Zealand dollar 
and the Swedish krone appreciated more against the debtors than the creditors of their 
countries. Notably, notwithstanding the common appreciation of their currencies, Canada, 
Sweden, Korea and Germany did not reduce their net surpluses by 2005, while Italy and 
New Zealand did. This finding explains why, as we discussed, there seems not to be any 
significant association between the variations in the exchange rates and the trade imbalances 
in the 2000s. 
 
5  Closing Remarks 
With this analysis we endeavoured to shed some light on the degree of complexity of the 
trade imbalances networks in the 1980s and 2000s, which increases along, at least, three 
dimensions. The first one is the number of nodes, i.e. countries, linked by an unbalanced 
relationship with their partners. The second one refers to the number of unbalanced 
relationships that each country entertains. The third one is the increasing degree of 
heterogeneity in countries’ net bilateral positions: a) for the average and median country, 
the number of creditors progressively outgrows that of debtors, b) the number of countries 
in surplus with many partners rises (probably because of the performance of the new 
emerging markets and commodity exporters), and c) the degree of concentration of 
surpluses is higher than that of deficits. 
This map of the trade imbalances networks in 2002 and 2005 informs policymakers in, 
at least, three ways. In the first place, it reveals that the existence of a parallelism between 
1985 and the 2000s cannot be given for granted in all dimensions. Differences are 
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numerous, difficult to ascertain and relevant for any adjustment process. In the second 
place, the number of players significantly involved in the matrix of bilateral imbalances is 
nowadays extremely vast. It is not just the network of trade flows that has grown over time, 
as shown in Fagiolo et al. (2008), but also that of net trade imbalances. Finally, the analysis 
shows that the group of countries running both numerous and large surpluses is much 
narrower than that including countries with several and large deficits. This implies that the 
former should be at the centre of any politically feasible attempt to redress global 
imbalances. This is at odds with the restrictive group of (mainly industrialised) countries 
which met so far in order to tackle (or, better, to plan to tackle) global imbalances. Our 
descriptive analysis thus corroborates the position of those who favour the involvement of 
a greater number of emerging markets in any international coordination plan, and it also 
casts some doubts on the effectiveness of any agreement concerning just a handful of 
countries. Unluckily, such complex coordinated efforts seem hardly conceivable in the 
currently fragmented international political environment. 
Although these findings help assessing the level of complexity of the current trade-
imbalances network, they do not say much about the need of arranging an international 
plan to close the imbalances. In principle, exchange rates could naturally move so as to 
reduce bilateral unbalanced positions. Traditional effective exchange rates, albeit 
representing a synthetic tool for seizing the evolution bilateral exchange rate movements, 
do not help to assess whether this is actually the case. In fact, they fail to take into account 
the net bilateral trade positions of the various countries. The new effective exchange rate 
measures we propose here (i.e. DWIs and SWIs) go in this direction. Their evolution 
suggests that the uncoordinated exchange rate movements occurred between 2002 and 
2006 were not conducive to the closure of all bilateral imbalances in a mutually consistent 
way.  
Our new measures are not meant to predict the prospective exchange rate adjustments 
that one would need to close bilateral and overall imbalances. First, exchange rate 
movements are not the only (and probably not even the main) determinants of 
imbalances.24 Second, our indices do not aspire to represent a summary of all bilateral 
exchange rates: given that we weight the bilateral rates by the bilateral imbalances, our 
indices do not consider the currencies of the countries with balanced trade relationships. 
                                                          
24International relative prices, domestic public expenditures and, as many argue, transnational 
capital flows play a role in the determination of trade imbalances as much as important as 
exchange rates (McKinnon and Schnabl 2006). 
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This being said, our results improve the understanding of the movements of exchange 
rates in a context of numerous bilateral trade imbalances. At the general level, for instance, 
we show that i) traditional trade-weighted measures, by not taking into account the trade 
balance position of the various trading partners, are of limited help in interpreting exchange 
rate dynamics, and that ii) the currencies of most countries have tended to appreciate (or 
depreciate) against the majority of the trading partners, independently from these latter 
being creditors or debtors.25  
From these findings one could conclude, as the advocates of the new Plaza do, that only 
a strong form of policy coordination has chances to produce a balanced adjustment. On the 
very same grounds, one could argue that coordination should extend to most of those 
economic policy measures, which can affect trade imbalances. 
Our findings, thus, strengthen an apparent paradox inherent in any plan aiming to close 
global imbalances: the more complicated and far reaching the coordination plan appears to 
be, the more necessary it becomes so as to ensure that the adjustment occurs in a mutually 
consistent fashion. 
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